Mobile phone data and COVID-19: Missing an opportunity? by Oliver, Nuria et al.
1/16 
Mobile phone data and COVID-19: 
Missing an opportunity? 
Nuria Oliver1,2, Emmanuel Letouzé2,3, Harald Sterly4, Sébastien Delataille5, Marco De Nadai6, 
Bruno Lepri2,6, Renaud Lambiotte7, Richard Benjamins8,9, Ciro Cattuto10,11, Vittoria Colizza12, 
Nicolas de Cordes13, Samuel P. Fraiberger14, Till Koebe2,15, Sune Lehmann16, Juan Murillo17,  Alex 
Pentland18, Phuong N Pham2,19, Frédéric Pivetta20, Albert Ali Salah2,21, Jari Saramäki22, Samuel V. 
Scarpino23, Michele Tizzoni11, Stefaan Verhulst24, Patrick Vinck2,19, 25 
March 26, 2020   
 
1 ELLIS, the European Laboratory for Learning and Intelligent Systems  
2 Data-Pop Alliance (USA, Colombia, Mexico, Senegal and Spain) 
3 OPAL Project  
4 University of Vienna, Austria 
5 Rosa, Belgium 
6 Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Italy 
7 University of Oxford, UK 
8 Telefonica, Spain 
9 OdiseIA, Spain 
10 University of Turin, Turin, Italy 
11 ISI Foundation, Italy 
12 INSERM, Sorbonne Université, Pierre Louis Institute of Epidemiology and Public Health, Paris, France 
13 Orange Group, France 
14 World Bank, Washington DC, USA 
15 Freie University, Berlin, Germany 
16  Technical University of Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark 
17 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Madrid, Spain 
18 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA  
19 Harvard University, Cambridge, USA 
20 Dalberg Data Insights, Belgium 
21 Utrecht University, The Netherlands 
22 Aalto University, Finland 
23 Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA 
24 The GovLab, New York University, USA 
25 Corresponding author: pvinck@hsph.harvard.edu  
2/16 
Abstract 
This paper describes how mobile phone data can guide government and public health 
authorities in determining the best course of action to control the COVID-19 
pandemic and in assessing the effectiveness of control measures such as physical 
distancing. It identifies key gaps and reasons why this kind of data is only scarcely 
used, although their value in similar epidemics has proven in a number of use cases. 
It presents ways to overcome these gaps and key recommendations for urgent action, 
most notably the establishment of mixed expert groups on national and regional 
level, and the inclusion and support of governments and public authorities early on. 
It is authored by a group of experienced data scientists, epidemiologists, 
demographers and representatives of mobile network operators who jointly put their 
work at the service of the global effort to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
1. Introduction 
The Coronavirus disease 2019-2020 pandemic (COVID-19) poses unprecedented challenges for 
governments and societies around the world [Anderson et al., 2020]. In addition to medical measures, 
non-pharmaceutical measures have proven to be critical for delaying and containing the spread of 
the virus [Chinazzi et al., 2020; Ferguson et al., 2020; Tian et al., 2020, Zhang et al., 2020; Di 
Domenico et al., 2020]. This includes (aggressive) testing and tracing, bans on large gatherings, 
school and university closures, international and domestic mobility restrictions and physical 
isolation, up to total lockdowns of regions and countries. However, effective and rapid decision-
making during all stages of the pandemic requires reliable and timely data not only about infections, 
but also about human behavior, especially on mobility and physical co-presence of people. 
Seminal work on human mobility has shown that mobile phone data can assist the modeling 
of the geographical spread of epidemics [Bengtsson et al., 2015; Finger et al., 2016; Tizzoni et al., 
2014; Wesolowski et al., 2012; Wesolowski et al., 2015]. Thus, researchers and governments have 
started to collaborate with private companies, most notably mobile network operators, to estimate 
and visualize the effectiveness of control measures. In China, Baidu data has been used to evaluate 
how the lockdown of Wuhan affected the spread of the virus [Kraemer et al., 2020; Lai et al., 2020]. 
In Italy, researchers and local governments are collaborating to estimate the effectiveness of travel 
restrictions [Pepe et al., 2020; adnkronos, 2020]. European authorities (including Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, France, and Spain) are working with researchers and mobile network operators to 
understand the compliance and impact of the social distancing measures put in effect to combat the 
COVID-19 pandemic and to identify and predict potential hotspots of the disease [El País 2020; The 
Verge 2020]. Using the city of Boston, United States, as a test case, researchers aggregated location 
data from over 180 apps to enable precise measurements of social distancing on a day-by-day basis, 
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and project in great detail the effects of different policies on the spread of COVID-19 [Martin-Calvò 
et al., 2020]. 
However, there is currently hardly any coordination or information exchange between these 
national or even regional initiatives, as also highlighted by Buckee et al. in a letter to Science [Buckee 
et al., 2020]. Although ad-hoc mechanisms can be effectively (but not easily) developed at the local 
or national level, regional or even global collaborations seem all but impossible given the number of 
actors, the range of interests and priorities, the variety of legislations concerned, and the need to 
protect civil liberties. The global scale and spread of the COVID-19 pandemic highlight the need for 
a more harmonized or coordinated approach. 
In the following sections, we outline in what ways and how mobile phone data can help to 
better target and design measures to contain and slow the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. We 
identify the key reasons why this is not happening on a much broader scale, and we give 
recommendations on how to make mobile phone data work against the virus. 
2. How can mobile phone data help to tackle the COVID-19 
pandemic? 
The use of mobile phone data into analytical efforts to control the COVID-19 pandemic can offer a 
critical contribution to four broad areas of investigations:  
• Situational awareness would benefit from increased access to previously unavailable 
population estimates and mobility information to enable stakeholders across sectors 
better understand COVID-19 trends and geographic distribution.  
• Cause-and-effect use cases can help stakeholders identify the key drivers and 
consequences of implementing different measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. 
They aim to establish which variables make a difference for a problem and whether 
further issues might be caused.  
• Prediction tasks would leverage real-time population counts and mobility data to enable 
new predictive capabilities and allow stakeholders to assess future risks, needs, and 
opportunities.  
• Impact assessment aims to determine which, whether, and how various interventions 
affect the spread of COVID-19 and requires data to identify the obstacles hampering 
the achievement of certain objectives or the success of particular interventions. 
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Situational awareness Cause-and-effect 
● What are the most common mobility 
flows within and between COVID-
affected cities and regions?  
● Which areas are spreading the 
epidemics acting as origin nodes in a 
mobility network, and thus could be 
placed under mobility restrictions? 
● Are people continuing to travel or 
congregate after social distancing and 
travel restrictions were put into place?  
● Are there hotspots at higher risk of 
contamination (due to a higher level of 
mobility, higher concentration of 
population)? 
● What are the key entry points, 
locations and movements of 
roamers/tourists? 
● What are variables that determine the 
success of social distancing 
approaches?  
● How do local mobility patterns impact 
the burden on the medical system?  
● Are business’ social distancing 
recommendations resulting in more 
workers working from home?  
● In what sectors are people working 
most from home? 
● What are the social and economic 
consequences of movement restriction 
measures? 
Prediction Impact 
● How are certain human mobility 
patterns likely to affect the spread of 
coronavirus? And what is the likely 
spread of COVID-19, based on existing 
disease models and up-to-date 
mobility data? 
● What are the likely effects of mobility 
restrictions on children’s education 
outcomes?  
● What are likely to be the economic 
consequences of restricted mobility for 
businesses?  
● How have travel restrictions impacted 
human mobility behavior and likely 
disease transmission?  
● What is the potential of various 
restriction measures to avert infection 
cases and save lives? 
● What is the effect of mandatory social 
distancing measures, including closure 
of schools?  
● How has the dissemination of public 
safety information and voluntary 
guidance impacted human mobility 
behavior and disease spread? 
Table 1: Examples of questions by areas of investigation 
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Mobile phone data in different epidemiological phases 
The importance and relevance of these areas of inquiry differ at various stages of the outbreak, but 
mobile phone data provide value throughout the epidemiological cycle, as shown in Fig.1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Pandemic intervals as defined by the US Center for Disease Control [CDC 2014] 
 
• In the early recognition and initiation phase of the pandemic, the focus is on 
situational analysis and the fast detection of infected cases and their contacts. Research 
has shown that quarantine measures of infected individuals and their family members, 
combined with surveillance and standard testing procedures, are effective as control 
measures in the early stages of the pandemic [Koo et al, 2020].  Individual mobility and 
contact data offer information about infected individuals, their locations and social 
network. Contact data can be collected through mobile apps [Dong et al., 2019; Ferretti 
et al., 2020], interviews, surveys, voluntary sharing of data, or by accessing individual 
mobile phone data, which presents serious ethical and legal concerns. 
• During the acceleration phase, when community transmission reaches exponential 
levels, the focus is on interventions for containment, which typically involve social 
contact and mobility restrictions. Aggregated mobile phone data is here crucial to assess 
the efficacy of implemented policies through the monitoring of mobility between and 
within affected municipalities. Mobility information also contributes to the building of 
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more accurate epidemiological models that can explain and anticipate the spread of the 
disease, as shown for Influenza A (H1N1) outbreak [Balcan et al., 2009]. These models, 
in turn, can inform the mobilization of resources (e.g. respirators, intensive care units).  
• Finally, during the deceleration and preparation phases, as the peak of infections is 
reached, restrictions will likely be lifted. Continued situational monitoring will be 
important as the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to come in waves [Ferguson et al. 
2020, see Fig. 2]. Near real-time data on mobility and hotspots will be important to 
understand how lifting and re-establishing various measures translate into behavior, 
especially to find the optimal combination of measures at the right time (e.g. general 
mobility restrictions, school closures, banning of large gatherings), and to balance these 
restrictions with aspects of economic vitality. After the pandemic has subsided, mobile 
data will be helpful for post-hoc analysis of the impact of different interventions on the 
progression of the disease, and cost-benefit analysis of mobility restrictions. The 
experience may also help design technology such as the Korean app (Corona 100m) to 
help people re-starting a (careful) social life without too much stress and further 
minimizing the spread of a disease. Along this line, researchers at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology and other collaborators are working on Private Kit: Safe Paths 
[Barbar et al., 2020], a free open-source and privacy-first contact-tracing technology 
that provides individuals with information on their interaction with diagnosed COVID-
19 carriers.  
 
 
Fig 2: Illustration of outbreaks (orange curve) and adaptive triggering (blue curve) of suppression 
strategies. [Ferguson et al. 2020: 12] 
3. Specific metrics for data-supported decisions 
Mobile phone traces can be exploited to infer human mobility and social interactions. Researchers 
have used various types of mobile network data (e.g. Call Details Records, x Data Records and 
passive records), GPS and mobile application data. Some of this data, such as CDRs, are collected 
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by mobile network operators for billing reasons, and each record contains information about the time 
and (approximate) geographical location of customers' interactions with the phone. Other data 
consists of very accurate geographic information that can be collected at a large scale by smartphone 
applications (Walle 2020), however often with limited coverage in developing countries and raising 
complex questions around privacy and civil liberties.  
We here identify some examples of aggregated metrics that can be computed from such data 
sources: 
• Origin-destination (OD) matrices are especially useful in the first epidemiological 
phases, where the focus is to assess the mobility of people. Researchers can compute the 
number of people that move from two different areas daily, which is assumed to be a 
proxy of human mobility. The areas might be identified as municipalities, provinces or 
even regions. They could be compared to a reference period in order to assess the 
reduction in mobility and could inform spatially explicit disease transmission models to 
evaluate the potential benefit of such reductions. They are also useful to monitor the 
impact of different social and mobility contention measures and to identify regions where 
the measures might not be effective or followed by the population.  
• Dwell estimations and hotspots are estimates of particularly high concentration of 
people in an area, which can be favorable to the transmission of the virus. These metrics 
are typically constructed within a municipality by dividing the city into grids or 
neighborhoods [Louail et al., 2014]. The estimated number of people in each geographical 
unit can be computed with different time granularities (e.g. 15’, 60’, 24h). 
• Amount of time spent at home, at work, other are estimates of the individual 
percentage of time spent at home/work/other location, which can be useful to assess 
the local aversion to countermeasures adopted by governments. The home and work 
locations need to be computed in a period of time prior to the deployment of mobility 
restrictions measures. The percentage of time spent in each location needs to be 
computed from stationary points, thus excluding people that move. Variations of the 
time spent on different locations is generally computed on an individual basis, and then 
spatially aggregated. 
• Contact matrices estimate the number and intensity of the face-to-face interactions 
people have in a day. They are typically computed by age-groups, and they showed to 
be extremely useful to assess and determine the decrease of the reproduction number of 
the virus [Zhang et al., 2020]. However, it is still challenging to estimate face-to-face 
interactions from co-location data [Génois and Barrat 2018]. 
 
Although there is still little information about the age-specific susceptibility to COVID-19 
infection, it is clear that age is an important risk factor for COVID-19 severity. We highlight, 
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therefore, the importance of estimating the metrics mentioned above by age groups [Zhang et al., 
2020]. 
 
4. Why is the use of mobile phone data not widespread, or a 
standard, in tackling epidemics?  
At present, there is still a scarce strategic use of mobile phone data for tackling the COVID-19 
pandemic. Although local alliances are starting to be formed, an internationally concerted action is 
still missing.  
In the past, notably in the Ebola outbreak of 2014-2016, several pilot or one-off activities 
have been initiated. However, there was no transition to “business as usual” in terms of standardized 
procedures to leverage mobile phone data or establish mechanisms for ‘data readiness’ in the country 
contexts [The Economist 2014, McDonald, 2016]. Technology has evolved (e.g. OPAL, Flowkit, also 
commercial products), high-level meetings have been held (e.g. the European Commission’s B2G 
Data Sharing high-level expert group), data analysis and sharing showed promising results, but the 
use of metrics derived from mobile phone data by governments and local authorities is almost non-
existent [Maxmen, 2019]. Why does this gap persist despite technical progress?  
We identify the following five reasons: 
• Capacity, awareness and digital mindset of governments and public authorities: 
Public authorities frequently lack the capacity, both for processing information that 
often is complex and requires multidisciplinary expertise (e.g. mixing location and health 
data, specialized modeling), as well as for establishing the necessary interdisciplinary 
teams and collaborations. Also, many government units are understaffed and sometimes 
also lack technological equipment. During the COVID-19 pandemic, most authorities 
are overwhelmed by the multiplicity and simultaneity of requests; as they have never 
been confronted with such a crisis, there are few predefined procedures and guides, so 
targeted and preventive action is quickly abandoned for mass actions.  Finally, many 
public authorities and decision-makers are not aware of the value that mobile phone 
data would provide for decision making and are often used to make decisions without 
knowing the full facts and under conditions of uncertainty.  
• Access to data: Most companies, including mobile network operators, tend to be very 
reluctant to make data available --- even aggregated and anonymized --- to researchers 
and/or governments. Apart from data protection issues, such data are also seen and 
used as commercial assets, thus limiting the potential use for humanitarian goals if there 
are no sustainable models to support operational systems. One should also be aware 
that not all mobile network operators in the world are equal in terms of data maturity. 
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Some are actively sharing data as a business, while others have hardly started to collect 
and use data.  
• Concerns about privacy and data protection. Governments in China, South Korea, 
Israel and elsewhere have openly accessed and used personal mobile phone data for 
tracking individual movements and for notifying individuals. However, in other regions, 
such as in Europe, both national and regional legal regulations limit such use (especially 
the European Union law on data protection and privacy known as the General Data 
Protection Regulation - GDPR). Furthermore, around the world, public opinion surveys, 
social media and a broad range of civil society actors including consumer groups and 
human rights organizations have raised legitimate concerns around the ethics, potential 
loss of privacy and long-term impact on civil liberties resulting from the use of individual 
mobile data to monitor COVID-19 and send personalized notifications to citizens. 
• Researchers and domain experts tend to define the scope and direction of analytical 
problems from their perspective and not necessarily from the perspective of 
governments’ needs. Critical decisions have to be taken, while key results are often 
published in scientific journals and in jargon that are not easily accessible to ‘outsiders’, 
including government workers and policy makers. 
• There is little to no preparedness for immediate and rapid action. On country levels, 
there are too few latent/‘standing’ mixed teams, composed of a) representatives of 
governments and public authorities, b) mobile network operators, c) different topic 
experts (virologists, epidemiologists, data analysts); and there are no procedures and 
protocols predefined.  
5. From words to deeds: A call to action to fight COVID-19 
To effectively build the best, most up to date, most relevant, and actionable knowledge, we call on 
governments, mobile network operators and researchers to form mixed teams: 
• Governments should be aware of the value of information and knowledge that can be 
derived from mobile phone data analysis, especially for sensible targeting and monitoring 
the necessary measures to contain the pandemic. They should enable and leverage the 
fair and responsible provision/use of aggregated and anonymized data for this purpose. 
• Mobile network operators should take their social responsibility and the vital role that 
they can play in tackling the pandemic. They should reach out to governments and the 
research community. 
• Researchers and domain experts (e.g. virologists, epidemiologists, demographers, data 
scientists, computer scientists and computational social scientists) should acknowledge 
interdisciplinarity and context specificities and sensitivities. They need to include 
governments and public authorities early on and throughout their efforts to identify the 
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most relevant questions and knowledge needs. Creating multi-disciplinary inter-
institutional teams is of paramount importance. 
 
The following principles would significantly improve the effectiveness of these mixed teams: 
• Include governments. Relevant government and public authorities should be involved early, 
and researchers need to build upon their knowledge systems and need for information. One 
key challenge is to make insights actionable―how can findings such as propagation maps 
finally be utilized (e.g. for setting quarantine zones, informing local governments, targeting 
communication). At the same time, expectations must be realistic: decisions on measures 
should be based on facts, but are in the end, always political decisions. 
• Liaise with data protection authorities and civil liberties advocates early on, 
transparently, and have quick iteration cycles with them. Consider creating an ethics and 
privacy advisory committees to oversee and provide feedback on the projects. This ensures 
that privacy is maintained and raises potential user acceptance. It is possible to make use 
of aggregated mobile phone data in line with even the relatively strict European regulations 
(GDPR). Earlier initiatives have established principles and methods for sharing data or 
indicators without endangering any personal information and build privacy-preserving 
solutions that use only incentives to manage behavior [Buckee et al., 2018; de Montjoye et 
al., 2018; Oliver et al., 2019]. The early inclusion of the data protection authority in Belgium 
(see box) has led to the publishing of a statement by the European Data Protection Board 
on how to process mobile phone data in the fight against COVID-19 [EDPB 2020]. Even 
while acknowledging the value of mobile phone data, the urgency of the situation should 
not lead to losses of data privacy and other civil liberties that might become permanent 
after the pandemic. In this regard, the donation of data for good (e.g. the MIT app) and 
the direct and limited (in time and scope) sharing of aggregated data by mobile network 
operators with (democratic) governments and researchers seems to be less problematic than 
the use of individual location data commercially acquired, brought together and analyzed 
by commercial enterprises. More generally, any emergency data system set to monitor 
COVID-19 and beyond must follow a balanced and well-articulated set of data policies and 
guidelines and be subjected to risk assessments.  
• Exchange internationally, with other domain experts, but also with other initiatives and 
groups; share findings quickly ― there will be time for peer-reviewed publications later. 
Especially in countries with weaker health systems, the targeting and effectiveness of non-
pharmaceutical interventions might make a big difference. This might also imply that 
relevant findings are translated from English to other relevant languages.  
• Prepare for all stages of the pandemic. For later stages of the pandemic, and for the 
future, a minimum level of “preparedness” for immediate and rapid action is needed. On 
country levels, there will be a need of ‘standing’ mixed teams; basic agreements and legal 
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prescriptions should be in place, procedures and protocols predefined (also for “appropriate 
anonymization and aggregation protocols” [Buckee et al., 2018]). 
 
Finally, in addition to (horizontal) international exchange, we also need international 
approaches that are coordinated by supranational bodies. National initiatives might help to a certain 
extent but will not be sufficient in the long run. A global pandemic necessitates globally or at least 
regionally coordinated work. Here, promising approaches are emerging: the EU Commission has on 
23.03.2020 called upon European mobile network operators to hand over anonymized and aggregated 
data to the Commission to track virus spread and determine priority areas for medical supplies 
[Politico 2020], while other coordination initiatives are emerging in Africa, Latin America and the 
Mena-Region. It will be important for such initiatives to link up, share knowledge and collaborate.   
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Belgium: “Data Against Corona” taskforce. 
On March 13th 2020, the Minister of Health and the Minister of Telecom and Privacy kicked-off 
a “Data Against Corona” taskforce that gathered four types of actors: i) representatives from 
the ministries, ii) data providers such as Mobile Network Operators and Sciensano (i.e. the 
national health data provider), iii) an operational team of experts (e.g. data science, spatial 
epidemiology, digital entrepreneurs), and iv) privacy and ethics committees. 
The goal of the taskforce was to flatten the curve of the epidemic, by combining 
location and epidemiological data, for targeted use cases (e.g. the Minister of Health needs to 
monitor the reduction in mobility following national confinement measures, needs to predict 
where the virus is likely to propagate to allocate resources). The Minister of Health’s teams 
prioritized the issues that would be most helpful, and the task force then collected and analyzed 
the relevant data and formulated the results as actionable information. 
To effectively support public authorities, the taskforce was built on these success 
factors: 1) A clear mandate from the government, with active participation from the cabinets; 2) 
a centralized, multi-disciplinary team that had proven experience from other epidemics (e.g. 
Ebola, Zika) and could leverage their models in an agile manner; 3) a legal and technical 
framework that guarantees privacy rights are preserved (the Belgian Data Protection Authority 
pre-authorized the analyses to be done before data processing activities even have begun); and 
4) feedback loops where public authorities continuously ranked the use cases by importance, 
confirmed which information needed to be provided daily, and linked the results with other task 
forces supporting the national crisis cell (e.g. resource allocation taskforce). 
In the Belgian example, public authorities took a “privacy-first” approach: use cases 
were ranked on effectiveness and privacy impact. From the resulting matrix, the taskforce 
prioritized a first wave of use cases based on anonymized and aggregated output. The taskforce 
monitored the evolution of the disease closely and prepared the grounds for use cases that 
require a stronger trade-off of effectiveness over privacy (i.e. data processing of higher 
granularity data). 
A similar task force was created in Spain on March 23rd, starting with a pilot in the 
Valencian region, to be further extended to the rest of the territory.  
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